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Abstract: The past few months have exposed serious problems in relation to 
Europe’s ability to cope with financial stress. Placing the new Financial Stability 
funds on a permanent basis, in the form of a new European Monetary Fund will 
be  required  if  Europe  is  to  deal  effectively  with  the  serious  debt  problems  of 
some Eurozone countries. However, this fund should exist to manage sovereign 
defaults in an orderly manner, not to prevent them altogether. Bank supervisors 
also need to publish regular stress tests, change their regulations on the risk 
weighting  of  sovereign  debt  and  put  new  resolution  procedures  in  place. 
Together,  these  reforms  will  allow  Europe  to  deal  with  future  sovereign  debt 
problems without provoking a crisis. 
 
 
                                                 
1 This is a briefing paper delivered by the author  to the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic 
and Monetary Affairs in his role as a member of an Expert Panel of advisors in relation to the Committee’s 




The  sovereign  debt  crisis  has  exposed  a  number  of  serious  problems  in  relation  to 
Europe’s ability to cope with financial stress. On May 9
th a series of bailout funds for 
Eurozone countries were announced: €440 billion in the form of a European Financial 
Stability Facility or EFSF (a special purpose vehicle funded by Euro area member states), 
€60 billion in the form a European Financial Stability Mechanism or EFSM (funded by the 
European Commission) and €250 billion made available by the IMF.  
 
While the public discussion of this decision has largely focused on the idea that the 
agreement was aimed at preserving the Euro as the common currency, the truth was 
more prosaic: The European banking system was already in a fragile state and would not 
have coped with a series of sovereign defaults. The need to maintain financial stability, 
specifically  banking  sector  stability,  was  what  prompted  the  unprecedented 
announcement of the bailout funds. 
 
The  announcement  of  the  emergency  bailout  funds  have  helped  to  restore  some 
stability to European sovereign bond markets, though spreads on the debt of some of 
the  countries  with  weak  fiscal  positions,  such  as  Ireland,  have  widened  in  recent 
months. In addition, the subsequent EU-wide stress test has provided some clarification 
of  the  extent  to  which  European  banks  are  exposed  to  sovereign  debt,  though  the 
funding situation for many banks still remains very challenging.  
 
Despite the progress made in the past few months in dealing with the sovereign debt 
crisis, we are still a long way from having permanent institutions in place that can deal 
with the type of crisis situations that arose this year. The EFSF and EFSM are explicitly 
temporary in nature, intended to expire after three years, while the IMF contingency 
support is also likely be available for a limited time. 
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In this paper, I first discuss what is likely to follow the EFSF and EFSM in relation to 
dealing with the sovereign debt issues. I argue that two principal approaches need to be 
taken. First, the temporary mechanisms should be formalised in the form of a European 
Monetary Fund, as proposed by Daniel Gros and Thomas Meyer. I outline how such a 
fund should operate, arguing that we need to able to deal with sovereign defaults in the 
Euro area in an orderly manner. Second, European banking regulation and supervision 
needs to be strengthened with the aim of making the banking system more robust to 
sovereign defaults. Finally, I offer some brief comments on the connection between the 
current crisis and the future of the Euro as a common currency. 
 
2. A Sovereign Debt Safety Net 
 
2.1 Formalising the Safety Net: A European Monetary Fund 
 
Even among those who may agree that the introduction of the €750 billion bailout fund 
was necessary, there are going to be different opinions as to how best to proceed from 
the current situation. 
 
Those who are concerned about the moral hazard implications of the bailout fund are 
likely to recommend taking a hard-line approach to future sovereign debt problems.  
This  position  views  the  recent  bailout  funds  announcements  (and  actual  bailout  of 
Greece) as highly unfortunate events brought on by crisis circumstances and argues in 
favour of returning as soon as possible to a position in which “no bailouts” is again the 
prevailing position of the EU in relation to sovereign debt problems.   
 
According to this argument, the key preparation work that needs to be done during the 
three years that the EFSF and EFSM are in place relates to fiscal adjustment and the 
reconstruction  of  fiscal  institutions  in  European  countries.  To  prevent  the  need  for 4 
 
future bailouts, this approach would emphasise that the key priorities for the next few 
years are: 
 
(a)  The adoption of budgetary adjustment plans that put all Eurozone countries back 
on the path to fiscal stability. 
 
(b)  A  new  tougher  approach  to  monitoring  of  national  budgets  by  the  EU 
Commission. 
 
(c)  The introduction of improved national budgetary institutions which will see a 
greater role for external assessment and for fiscal rules. 
 
There is an important ongoing debate within the various European institutions about 
how to achieve these improvements in budgetary management with many good ideas 
being  discussed  by  the  van  Rompuy  task  force.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  improved 
institutions will indeed deliver a more sustainable fiscal future. 
 
It would be unwise, however, to believe that improved fiscal rules will allow us to rule 
out the possibility of severe fiscal problems arising in one or a number of Eurozone 
countries, so that the EFSF and EFSM can simply be allowed to expire without providing 
a replacement. There are a number of reasons for this: 
 
(a)  A  number  of  European  countries  are  in  precarious  fiscal  positions  and 
adjustment plans are likely to take a number of years. Thus, it is unlikely that those 
European countries currently under threat will be restored to fiscal stability by 2013. 
 
(b)  The health of the European banking system remains in question. The most likely 
trigger for sovereign defaults in the next few years is a prolonged period of slow growth 
or perhaps a double-dip recession. Should this occur, it will also have a negative effect 5 
 
on the capital position of the banking system and this would lead to the reoccurrence of 
the joint sovereign\banking problems that have emerged this year. In other words, we 
cannot assume that future fiscal problems will occur against the background of a strong 
banking system, which could allow for a more hard-line “no bailout” approach. 
 
For these reasons, preparations should be made to formalise the EFSF and EFSM into a 
single  fund  to  assist  Eurozone  countries  that  are  having  difficulty  with  sovereign 
borrowing. In line with the proposals by Daniel Gros and Thomas Meyer (2010) which 
were  circulated  prior  to  the  events  of  May  this  year,  I  will  refer  to  this  fund  as  a 
European Monetary Fund or EMF. 
 
2.2.  Mechanics of a European Monetary Fund 
 




In  terms  of  its  key  job  of  making  loans to  European  countries  that are  shut  out of 
sovereign debt markets, the detailed framework agreement for the European Financial 
Stability Facility provides most of the ingredients for what appears to be a workable 
model that can be taken up  by a future European Monetary Fund that is put on a 
permanent basis.  
 
In relation to the decision to administer a loan from the EMF to a European country, the 
loan application should trigger a process in which the European Commission and the 
EMF  analyse  the  country’s  economic  and  budgetary  position  and  agree  a  fiscal 
adjustment program that must be adhered to if the loan program is to be maintained. 
This program can then be recommended to the Eurogroup of finance ministers who 
make the final decision on making the loan.  
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Staffing and Ongoing Monitoring 
The EMF should be well enough staffed to be able to deal with emergency requests and 
the associated negotiations about fiscal adjustment in a timely manner.  This raises the 
question, of course, of how to maintain a high quality and motivated staff for the EMF 
given the likelihood that its loan-making services are probably not going to be used most 
of time. The answer to this is that the EMF should be centrally involved in the ongoing 
(and  improved)  process  of  monitoring  of  national  budgets  under  the  Stability  and 
Growth Pact. Up to now, this process has been handled by the European Commission.  
However,  if  an  EMF  is  to  be  the  organisation  charged  with  helping  out  European 
countries in severe financial trouble, then it will be necessary and appropriate for them 
to maintain an ongoing engagement with each country that is eligible to obtain loans 
from the fund. 
 
Financing 
The  EFSF  also  provides  a  clear  model  for  how  the  EMF  can  be  financed.  Eurozone 
countries  provide  guarantees  that  allow  for  a  Special  Purpose  Vehicle  to  be  over-
collateralised and thus be AAA rated. The SPV can then borrow on the bond market and 
lend the funds to applicant countries at a higher rate, reflecting the potential default 
risk. Any profits made from these transactions can then be retained to further capitalise 
the fund. 
 
Of course, while the EFSF’s structure is an obvious model for the initial capitalisation of 
the fund, one can imagine other ways to finance the fund on an ongoing basis. Gros and 
Meyer  have  proposed  that  the  fund  by  financed  in  a  way  that  acts  as  an  ongoing 
incentive for countries to comply with the guidelines of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
Specifically, Gros and Meyer recommend that participating countries should contribute 
a fraction of each percentage point of GDP for which their debt-GDP ratio exceeds 60 7 
 
percent and another fraction for each percentage point of GDP for which their deficit 
exceeds 3 percent. 
 
The Gros-Mayer proposal suggests a mechanism for financing an EMF that would also 
help to reduce the likelihood that the fund is called upon.  As a solution to an economics 
optimisation problem, it is both clever and efficient. However, I suspect it would prove 
very difficult to get this particular proposal implemented in practice. Governments in 
countries that currently have high debt ratios are likely to feel under enough pressure to 
get their fiscal houses in order over the next few years, so this additional pressure would 
be likely to be very unwelcome. Also, while the proposal may be politically popular in 
those countries with relatively low debts, it would be extremely unpopular in high debt 
countries. Insisting on such a proposal may end up undermining the continuation of the 
current bailout funds in a new guise.   
 
Another  question  about  this  financing  proposal  is  whether  it  would  require  a  new 
Treaty.  The  current  structure  of  the  EFSF  did  not  require  any  legal  changes  to  the 
European Treaty as it is justified by Article 122 of the current consolidated Treaty on the 
grounds that it allows emergency help to a country facing “severe difficulties caused by 
natural  disasters  or  exceptional  occurrences  beyond  its  control”.  For  this  reason,  it 
would  not  appear  that  putting  the  facility  on  a  permanent  basis  would  necessarily 
require a new Treaty.  However, it seems more likely that binding arrangements in 
which Eurozone countries are mandated to make specific contributions to an EMF based 
on their current debt and debt levels would require a new Treaty.
2  If this was the case 
(and I am not a legal expert, so it may not be) it would seem unlikely that such a Treaty 
could survive the complex ratification process. 
 
                                                 
2 This situation may change depending on the outcome of the German’s Constitutional Court’s examination 
of this issue. 
 8 
 
2.3.  Allowing for Orderly Default 
 
If the current bailout arrangements are to be formalised, an important question that 
arises is exactly what precedent has been set by the decisions made in May 2010. One 
potential interpretation is that the establishment of the EFSF has meant that the EU is 
committed to the principle that no Eurozone member state can default. Indeed, much of 
public discussion in the run-up to the May 9th announcement focused on the idea that 
it would be unthinkable for a Eurozone country to default on its sovereign debt.  The 
idea that the Euro is more than an economic construct but part of a greater political 
project  is  commonly  mentioned  to  justify  the  need  to  avoid  default  by  a  member 
country: Euro membership, it is often argued, brings with it an obligation of all members 
to prevent a default on the part of their partners in the monetary union. 
 
The Need for Potential Default 
While  the  idea  that  default  by  a  Euro  area  country  is  unthinkable  is  commonly 
expressed, not least by leading politicians and central bankers, this ambition is too far-
reaching and is unlikely to be achieved. Instead, I believe the more credible approach is 
the one that has been stressed by leading German politicians, most notably Wolfgang 
Schauble,  which  is  to  emphasise  the  need  for  procedures  to  manage  default  by  a 
Eurozone country in an orderly manner.
3  
 
Greece is likely to provide an early testing ground for an EMF’s approach to the question 
of sovereign default. The Greek adjustment plan is an ambitious one, with very large 
adjustments required to bring the budget deficit back towards the 3 percent range by 
2014. However, this plan can hardly be considered a final solution to Greece’s fiscal 
problems. The plan envisages Greece having a debt-GDP ratio in 2013 of 149% and with 
a flow of debt interest payments of over 8 percent of GDP. At that point, however, 
                                                 
3 Jacques Melitz (2010) has also presented a strong case for the need to allow for possible sovereign 
defaults in the Euro area. 9 
 
Greece’s primary balance will be in surplus. Faced with a huge debt burden but with the 
ability to survive without new net borrowing, the Greek government will have a strong 
incentive  to  consider  restructuring  its  debt  and,  ultimately,  this  will  be  a  national 
decision. 
 
The role of an EMF should not be to prevent a sovereign default or debt restructuring 
but rather to ensure that it occurs in an orderly manner that minimises disruptions in 
the defaulting country as well as knock-on effects on other sovereign borrowers and 
financial markets. Disruption to economic activity within the defaulting country can be 
achieved by the provision of loans to the government that is restructuring its debt, 
assisting  it  up  until  the  point  where  it  has  regained  credibility  with  private  bond 
markets. 
 
Mechanics of Default 
In  relation  to  minimising  the  impact  on  financial  markets,  Gross  and  Mayer  have 
proposed that the EMF would set the terms of a restructuring, taking over all of the 
defaulting country’s sovereign debt at a haircut set at a level that is designed to avoid 
financial system instability.  This strikes me as perhaps too deep an involvement for the 
EMF.  
 
It  is  likely  that  an  EMF  will  be  a  key  creditor  for  countries  that  are  facing  default: 
Countries in this situation will almost certainly already have significant loans from the 
EMF. However, the EMF’s debt is likely to only have the same status as other sovereign 
debt. In an interview with Dow Jones Newswire, EFSF Chief Executive Klaus Regling 
confirmed that “Unlike the IMF, the EFSF will not be a preferred creditor. It will have the 
same standing as any other sovereign claim on the country, pari passu.”
4   
 
                                                 
4 See www.efinancialnews.com/story/2010-07-19/klaus-regling-explains-the-eu-stability-fund 10 
 
If this precedent is followed, then the EMF can play a key role in debt restructuring 
negotiations by indicating the terms of the haircuts that they see as appropriate for 
their loans.  However, ultimately, the outcome of these negotiations should involve the 
government of the defaulting country, private sector creditors as well as the EMF.  I 
would not recommend that the EMF take over all claims against the defaulting country 
by means of offering a haircut that is more generous to bondholders than they would 
obtain in bilateral negotiations with the defaulting government.  
 
An important long-run benefit of a Greek default is that it would allow a future role for 
bond market monitoring of national sovereign debt risk. If bond market participants 
understand that Eurozone sovereign debt can still be defaulted on despite the existence 
of an EMF, then we are likely to see the markets pay close attention to ongoing fiscal 
developments in high debt countries. We would also likely see a continuation of higher 
spreads on peripheral Eurozone sovereign debt than prevailed prior to the current crisis: 
This would provide a market-based incentive for countries to reduce their debt levels, as 
markets  would  reward  countries  that  get  the  fiscal  houses  in  order  with  lower 
borrowing rates. 
 
In emphasising the need for a framework for orderly defaults with realistic haircuts, I am 
aware of course that the EMF will have to take financial stability considerations into 
account. There can be little doubt that a series of sovereign defaults with large haircuts 
would have caused severe financial stability problems during Summer 2010 given the 
current weak state of the European banking system.  However, as I discuss below, it is 
important that the next few years see an improvement in European bank capital levels 
and  also  the  introduction  of  efficient  resolution  regimes  for  failed  banks.  Together, 





Implications of Defaults for Political Support for Europe 
Finally, what of the idea that a sovereign default would undermine support for the Euro 
within the defaulting country? I think it is far from clear that this would be the case. 
 
A debt restructuring may be associated with a painful fiscal adjustment program and 
may also be a cause for national embarrassment. However, if a country’s government 
has  reached  the  point  where  default  is  being  considered,  then  it  is  likely  that  the 
alternative approach of soldiering on under a huge debt burden will also be very painful. 
Even if the EU could somehow ensure that a country in this situation did not default 
(and it’s not clear that it can ensure this) it would be unlikely that the citizens of the 
country would be grateful to the EU (or the euro) for facilitating this outcome. 
 
3. Improved European Banking Supervision 
 
The Financial Stability referred to in the EFSF and EFSM relates largely to the stability of 
the European banking system.  Uncertainty about the exposures of European banks to 
distressed sovereign debt has made funding conditions difficult for banks throughout 
Europe.  The  need  to  avoid  the  type  of  financial  meltdown  that  accompanied  the 
Lehmans default of 2008 was the principle motivating force behind the establishment of 
the bailout funds. 
 
In addition to the permanent establishment of a European Monetary Fund, the other 
key direction in which policy needs to adjust is the improvement of the supervision and 
regulation of the European banking sector to avoid a repeat of the situation that arose 
this  year.  One  clear  requirement  is  for  an  increase  in  bank  capital  ratios  and  an 
improvement in capital quality. This development will make the whole banking system 
more capable of coping with losses of any sort.  It is to be hoped that the ongoing Basle 
3 negotiations will see some steps taken in this direction, though it is disappointing to 12 
 
see proposals for tougher regulation apparently being consistently watered down in the 
negotiations. 
 
In addition to higher capital ratios, there are three areas where I believe there is a need 
for new approaches. 
 
Stress Tests 
One of the key problems that generated the financial tensions that begun in 2007 and 
rapidly  worsened  after  September  2008  was  the  uncertainty  about  the  size  of  the 
holdings by various banks of subprime mortgage backed securities as well as uncertainty 
about the value of the cashflows underlying these complex securities. Sovereign bonds 
are not complex securities but banks can sometimes be restrictive in relation to public 
disclosure of the composition of their sovereign bond holdings and uncertainty about 
these holdings was a factor in the recent period of financial turmoil. 
 
For  this  reason,  the  stress  tests  performed  by  the  Committee  of  European  Banking 
Supervisors (CEBS) in July were a useful exercise. They clarified the extent of sovereign 
bond holding of various types across Europe’s leading banks. The particular “stress test” 
applied  was  not,  however,  particularly  stressful.  Most  sovereign  bonds  are  kept  on 
“banking books” as opposed to “trading books” for accounting purposes. With the short 
time horizon examined (only up to 2011) and the assumption of no sovereign default 
during this period, the CEBS exercise did not provide an accurate picture of the exposure 
of the European banking system to a true stress scenario in which there are sovereign 
defaults. 
 
That said, the exercise did help to get enough information into the public domain to 
allow others to perform more accurate stress tests: For example, both Citibank and the 13 
 
OECD have released analyses that indicate the full scale of the exposures to sovereign 
debt and they clearly illustrate that such defaults would trigger serious problems.
5  
 
These stress tests should now become a regular event, occurring at least once a year. In 
addition, it may be a good idea to hand responsibility for the design of the stress test 
over to the new European Systemic Risk Board. Hopefully, th ese exercises will become 
more honest about the likely outcome of stress scenarios if placed in the hand of a body 
charged with preventing systemic financial instability. 
 
 
Regulatory Treatment of Sovereign Debt 
One reason that banks hold sovereign debt is that the Basle capital adequacy rules 
deem them to be a very low risk and thus allow banks to increase their leverage. Indeed, 
the Basle 2 rules allow sovereign debt rated above AA- to carry a risk weight of zero 
while similarly rated corporate bonds have a risk weight of 20%.
6  Similarly, government 
bonds rated from A+ to A- to have a risk weight of 20% while similarly rated corporate 
bonds have a risk weight of 50%.  This regulatory approach can mean that banks that 
have considerable holdings of sovereign bonds may appear to be well capitalised but 
are, in fact, highly vulnerable to sovereign defaults. Whatever emerges from the Basle 3 
negotiations, European regulators should end this asymmetry between the regulatory 
treatment of sovereign and corporate bonds.   
 
In addition, regulators should enforce strict limits on the extent to which banks hold the 
debt of their own country’s government.  The tendency to hold large amounts of local 
country debt may be due to the continuation of long-standing practices that pre-date 
EMU. It is also likely that, in recent years, there has been pressure on banks that have 
been helped by government bailouts of various kinds to respond in kind by providing 
                                                 
5 See Citibank research note of 26 July 2010 “European Bank Stress Tests: Delight in Details, Headlines 
Underwhelm” and the OECD paper by Blundell-Wignall and Slovik. 
6 See page 19 of  BIS (2006) for the sovereign bond figures and page 23 for the corporate bond figures. 14 
 
funding  for  their  sovereign.  However,  this  is  a  dangerous  practice  from  a  financial 
stability perspective: These bonds are a particularly poor “hedge” for banks because 
they are likely to default during periods when the rest of a bank’s balance sheet is also 
deteriorating due to poor local economic conditions.  
 
Recapitalisation and Resolution Regimes 
Finally, just as the best approach to sovereign default risk is to accept that every so 
often  countries  will  default,  the  best  approach  to  handling  the  financial  stability 
implications of such a default is to accept that, despite regulators best efforts to ensure 
that banks are equipped to cope, some European banks will get into severe trouble 
when such defaults occur. 
 
Europe needs to have an agreed set of rules as to how to deal with failing banks, so as to 
avoid a repeat of the spectacle of late 2008’s ad hoc patchwork of liability guarantee 
and recapitalisation programs.  Two sets of policies need to be developed: Policies for 
dealing  with  systemically  important  banks  that  are  becoming  undercapitalised  and 
policies for dealing with failed banks.  
 
On recapitalisation, I am inclined to support Willem Buiter’s call for a pan-European 
Financial Institution Recapitalisation Fund (FIRF), funded by national governments and 
perhaps also by taxes on financial activity.
7 This fund could work hand in hand with a 
new tougher approach to bank capital standards. Large European banks that fail stress 
tests  could  be  given  the  choice  of  raising  capital  externally  or  accepting  equity 
investment from the FIRF. The terms of these investments and the policy on subsequent 
sales of equity shares would be standardised and designed to maximise a return for the 
fund. 
 
                                                 
7 See Buiter’s Citibank Global Economics View paper “Sovereign Debt Problems in Advanced Industrial 
Countries”. 15 
 
In some cases, however, banks may turn out to be insolvent and recapitalisation by the 
FIRF  would  be  a  poor  use  of  taxpayer  funds.  In  this  situation,  it  is  important  that 
regulators intervene once capitalisation falls below a certain level and put the bank into 
resolution regime, which sees the banks creditors compensated in accordance with their 
seniority.  The  legal  structure  for  such  a  regime  could  follow  the  Special  Resolution 
Regime established in the UK.   
 
Depending  on  the  financial  stability  situation  prevailing  at  the  time,  regulators  can 
decide whether or not public funds should be provided to compensate senior bond 
holders and other providers of longer-term funding. However, it is important that there 
be agreement that providers of Tier One capital (equity and subordinated bond holders) 
are not compensated. If providers of risk capital to large European banks believe that 
there are limits to how much downside risk they will have to take on, then the cycle of 
excessive risk taking by banks followed by banking system failure, is likely to continue. 
 
4. Financial Stability Is Not “Saving the Euro” 
 
Finally,  I  think  it  is  important  to  put  this  discussion  into  some  perspective  and  to 
understand what is, and what is not, at stake in relation to these proposals.  
 
It  is  important  that  Europe  put  in  place  a  framework  for  dealing  with  severe  fiscal 
problems in its member states. Disorderly sovereign defaults, perhaps combined with 
the need to reduce a budget deficit to zero, can cause unnecessary trouble for the 
defaulting  country’s  citizens.  They  can  also  cause  serious  problems  for  financial 
institutions inside and outside the defaulting countries and the recent global crisis has 
painfully  provided  more  evidence  for  how  financial  instability  can  trigger  serious 
disruptions in the real economy. 
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For all of these reasons, Europe needs to implement some serious institutional reforms 
in the area of budgetary policy, emergency assistance for distressed sovereigns and 
banking sector stability. These reforms matter for all EU countries, not just the members 
of  the  Eurozone.  However,  because  Eurozone  members  do  not  have  the  option  of 
devaluing, they are more likely to fall victim to sovereign debt and financial stability 
problems in the face of a severe recession.  
 
In this sense, the reforms that are under discussion need to be implemented if the 
Eurozone is to maintain financial and fiscal stability. However, the continued use of 
overheated language about “saving the Euro” or even “supporting the stability of the 
Euro” is, in my opinion, inaccurate and unhelpful. Eurozone countries that experience a 
sovereign default are not, in fact, likely to leave the Euro after the default.  The series of 
practical  problems  associated  with  unilaterally  issuing  a  new  currency  and  then 
devaluing it (see Eichengreen, 2007) are such that it is unlikely to be considered as an 
option by defaulting countries.  
 
The Euro may still break up, however, if it becomes unpopular with the public in core 
countries such as France and Germany. If new institutions such as a European Monetary 
Fund are seen institutionalising bailouts to less disciplined Eurozone countries, they may 
play  an  important  role  in  undermining  the  Euro.    Those  who  support  these  new 
institutions will need to ensure that they are well designed if they are to improve, rather 
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